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Abstract 
This chapter offers a feminist reading of Pashukanis’s legal theory as a contribution to 
critical evaluation of the relationship between legality, commodification and gender. 
Contemporary feminist interests in the relationship between legal and non-legal norms, in 
the role of commodification, and in the limits of gender as a category of analysis, make a 
re-engagement with Pashukanis timely. For Pashukanis, legal form constitutes subjects as 
if they have property rights over objects, generates exchange value, and represents 
differently situated subjects as if they are equal.  Here I develop an account of legal form 
analysis that recuperates Pashukanis’s distinction between legal form and technical 
regulation, his theorisation of the subject of commodification, and his historical method 
of form/content analysis.  Drawing on this critical reading of Pashukanis, I argue for the 
development of legal form analysis so as to accommodate the roles of social reproduction 
and consumption in the generation of care value and use value in commodity-exchanging 
societies. I illustrate this method by providing a legal form analysis of a conflict in 
consent rights over the use of genetically related embryos.  Such an analysis asks how 
consent rights would extract care value from the subject’s reproductive wishes, recognise 
contributions to the development of the embryo, and recognise investments in the future 
use of that embryo.  In this way, legal form analysis provides a reading of legal 
contributions to the generation of value from human reproductive activities without 
making assumptions about their gendered content.   
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LEGAL FORM, COMMODITIES AND REPRODUCTION: READING PASHUKANIS  
 
Ruth Fletcher  
 
Legality, commodification and gender 
Critical reflection on feminist engagement with law has expressed concern about the 
limits of law’s particular dimensions and about law’s relationship with other forms of 
normative ordering. Some have responded by developing legal critique through revisiting 
core legal values such as respect (Munro, 2007). Others have called for the further 
distancing of critique from reform in order to interrogate the regulatory capacities of 
legalism (Brown and Halley, 2002). Hunter, Rackley and McGlynn (2010) focus on 
generating the content of gender-sensitive arguments in the aspiration that law will 
change through the adoption of new content.   Others have addressed ‘legal 
technicalities’, such as jurisdiction, in order to consider the critical resources which they 
may offer (Drakopoulou, 2006; Valverde, 2009).  Here, I respond to these insights by 
reading them as a collective invitation to reconsider the relationship between legal form 
and content from a materialist perspective.  
 
More particularly, I suggest that the critique of commodity form continues to offer 
resources for thinking through this relationship. I argue that a feminist re-reading of 
Pashukanis is timely because it responds to a number of feminist concerns. His 
theorisation of the connection between commodity form and legal form helps with 
feminist interest in legality and the relationship between legal and non-legal forms of 
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regulation. Similarly, his focus on the relationship between law and commodification 
provides a springboard for thinking through a critical method of legal analysis, one which 
asks how formal law contributes to the generation of value from human activities. And 
finally, Pashukanis’s method also provides a valuable resource for feminist critique 
because it offers a way of thinking about gender as a concept which changes through the 
expansion and contraction of its form and content.  Through this critical reading of 
Pashukanis I go on to develop legal form analysis in light of more recent work on social 
reproduction and consumption.  
 
Legal form analysis draws on and contributes to feminist work on commodification, the 
process of turning entities into commodities by giving them exchange as well as use 
value in the marketplace, in two distinct ways. On the one hand, feminists are interested 
in the ways in which gender relations are interpreted and changed if and when they are 
commodified (Bakker and Silvey, 2008; Adkins, 2009). This strand of work allows us to 
see that gender relations are not always commodified and that commodification cannot 
explain everything about gender (Radin, 1987). Rather, a critical engagement with 
commodification enables understanding of the relationship between commodified and 
non-commodified processes and how this relationship changes over time.  Adkins for 
example critiques the argument (made by some scholars of immaterial labour) that 
productive labour is increasingly like socially reproductive labour in its service qualities 
and its affective, cognitive and communicative dimensions (2009).  Her critique is that 
this argument relies on a Fordist conception of social reproduction where care of men and 
children was done without pay in the home.  Now that most women work in the paid 
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marketplace, the labour of social reproduction has been increasingly commodified, as it is 
performed by paid domestic workers (see further Bakker and Gill, 2003; Bakker, 2007: 
545). On the other hand, feminists are interested in the ways in which gender is integral 
to the form of commodification processes. In this second sense, gender may work 
through and contribute to these processes, and is not external to them (Wilson, 2010; 
Cooper, D., 2008). Desire and care, for example, are key gendering practices, which may 
contribute to commodification by motivating exchange. Investigating the role of law in 
generating value from human activities can contribute to these feminist interests in the 
effects of commodification on gender relations and in the working of gender through 
commodification.  
 
As feminism’s key concept, gender has been subjected to extensive scrutiny, both in 
terms that question its relation with sex and its relation with other dimensions of human 
experience (Halley, 2006; Grabham et al, 2008; Samuels, 2009). Arguably, the scrutiny 
of the sex/gender relation has produced two kinds of critique. The first considers that 
feminist sex/gender analysis has ceded too much conceptual power to gender as it relates 
to sex. In moving beyond an assumed focus on women and examining the relational 
categories of femininity and masculinity, post de Beauvoirian gender analysis adopted an 
understanding of sex and physical materiality as that upon which gender works or 
imprints itself (Scott, 1986; Butler, 1993: 18). For some critics, this has contributed to an 
under-theorisation of the sexed body as an active force, or to women as agents, rather 
than objects, of feminism. The second kind of critique argues that gender continues to be 
over-determined by sex as a natural dichotomy. Delphy for example has argued that “we 
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have continued to think of gender in terms of sex: to see it as a social dichotomy 
determined by a natural dichotomy. We now see gender as the content with sex as the 
container” (Delphy, 1996: 33; see also Leonard and Adkins, 1996: 16). These two kinds 
of critique appear to contradict each other by attributing too much analytical power to 
different sides of the sex/gender distinction. I suggest that this problem may be overcome 
by reading the sex/gender distinction from a materialist perspective as one of 
form/content. 
 
The second challenge to gender has come from those who deem class, ethnicity, 
disability and other dimensions of human experience to have been significant forces in 
constituting the meaning of gender or the value of gendered subjects. At least since 
Crenshaw argued that the experience of African American women was not being 
accommodated by discrimination law, feminist legal theory has struggled with the 
problem of ‘intersectionality’ (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991; Grabham et al, 2008). In addition, 
critics of processes ranging from globalisation to colonialism have shown how gender 
may be a constituent, but not necessarily the primary, variable in producing conditions of 
gendered inequality in particular circumstances (McClintock, 1995). These critiques have 
identified the need to conceive of gender as an open category whose form and content 
will vary depending on its material relationship with other social forces. It is my 
contention that a critical reading of Pashukanis’s method of form/content analysis enables 
such a rethinking of gender. 
 
 
 
5 
Some feminists would question the usefulness of an approach like Pashukanis’s on the 
grounds that a materialist focus on the relations of exchange cannot explain gender 
relations. But as Leonard and Adkins (1996: 10-11) argued some time ago, this kind of 
critique relies upon a particular understanding of the ‘material’. If the material is 
understood according to the Marxist feminism version defended by Barrett in the 1980s, 
in terms of the capital/labour contradiction as part of the economic mode of production, 
then it is easier to understand why this version of materialism could not explain gender 
relations except in ideological terms. However, other feminists, such as O’Brien (1981) 
and Delphy (1984), who engaged with Marxist historical materialism, developed a 
different conception of the ‘material’ in their analyses of sexual relations. They separated 
out Marx’s method from the object of his analysis i.e. capitalism, and developed concepts 
to explain the sexual division of labour (see also Mackintosh, 1981; Tabet, 1996). The 
understanding of the ‘material’, which Delphy, for example, advocated, stems from the 
contradictions between ‘men’ and ‘women’ as social categories within marriage, whereby 
women and men are located in different relations of production and women’s labour 
appropriated through non-capitalist processes (see also Jackson, S. 2001). Materialist 
approaches today continue to be interested in the relationship between human activities 
and the conditions in which they occur (Klotz, 2006; Hennessy and Ingraham, 1997; 
Gibson-Graham, 1996; 2006; Bakker, 2007). By reading Pashukanis through more 
contemporary contributions on the significance of consumption and social reproduction, 
we can avoid some of pitfalls of his original conception of the legal form/content 
analysis.  
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In arguing that a critical recuperation of Pashukanis contributes to feminist analysis of the 
relationship between legality, commodification and gender, I next identify key relevant 
features of Pashukanis’ thought. I focus in particular on his distinction between legality 
and technical regulation, his account of legal subjectivity, and his method. I argue for a 
non-teleological reading of Pashukanis’s historical method so that this legal form will 
change as it accommodates different content, but in a manner which allows for a 
fragmented, non-linear history.  The next section, on legal form and reproductive carers, 
draws on earlier work on the legal form of reproductive responsibility (Fletcher, 2003). It 
shows how Pashukanis’ legal form analysis may be developed in order to account for the 
contribution of non-commodified care to commodity-exchanging societies. Legal forms 
of care obligations contribute to social reproduction by implying the exercise of will over 
reproduction and enabling the transferability of care after birth.  By way of illustration, I 
discuss how legal form analysis of care obligations during pregnancy highlights the gap 
between law’s formal attribution of gestational obligations and its limitation of the 
possibilities of exiting or earning from gestational labour.  In the final section, I consider 
how a focus on consumption as an aspect of commodification enables a further 
modification of Pashukanis’s concept of legal form. Consumption takes legal form by 
constituting the subject as a ‘user’ with individual rights to use goods and services, rather 
than as a property owner per se. I consider further how legal forms of user rights are 
having an impact in relation to embryo use for reproductive purposes.  
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Pashukanis and legal form analysis 
Pashukanis developed a general theory of law from a Marxist perspective through a 
critique of fundamental juridical concepts (Pashukanis, 1989).  His contribution is usually 
acknowledged by socio-legal scholars as an interesting non-functionalist Marxist account 
of law (Balbus, 1977; Fletcher, 2003: 219; Head, 2008). His account of legal form 
investigates the socio-legal relation by analysing the particular contribution of legality to 
commodity-exchanging societies. For Pashukanis, law develops alongside 
commodification to regulate affairs as if they were conflicts of private interests 
(Pashukanis, 1989: 72). Law constitutes the subject as a bearer of rights over 
commodities, so that these commodities can be exchanged.  Accordingly, law is not just 
an effect of other social relations; it has an autonomous role in constituting subjects as 
those who have control over commodities. His theory has been criticised for over-
generalising from exchange relations and for wrongly predicting the withering away of 
law in a socialist future (Hunt, 1985: 24; Warrington, 1983: 256; Fudge, 1999). However, 
even if he was wrong in his generalisation and his prediction of the future, his approach 
to legality, legal subjectivity, and his method of form/content analysis, have something to 
offer. 
 
In explaining legality, Pashukanis drew a distinction between law and technical 
regulation. Technical regulation governed with one purpose, whereas law was concerned 
with adjudicating a conflict of private interests (Head, 2008: 296). Running the railways 
was an example of technical regulation as far as Pashukanis was concerned. He thought 
that the promotion of communal good was sufficiently single-purpose enough to avoid 
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conflict in such situations. This distinction between the legal and the technical does not 
map neatly onto a distinction between the market and the state, but is more of a 
distinction between conflict and consensus as modes of regulation. Legal form and 
technical form are no longer exclusive in the way Pashukanis implied, if indeed they ever 
were (see further Baldwin and Black, 2008). Regulatory forms which rely on consensus 
and collaboration are a key means of promoting commodity exchange, particularly in an 
era of public-private partnerships (see further Lewis, 2005; Bignami, 2010). And the 
potential for conflict between rights-holders has been mitigated by the public provision of 
goods and services, so that law is often about ensuring fair process in that regard rather 
than about adjudicating on conflicts (Hunt, 1993: 14).  As a result, legal form analysis 
ought not exclude those forms of regulation which work through legal institutions in 
order to achieve common goals.   Such regulatory forms may attribute property rights as 
part of a communal effort to enlist subjects in the promotion or support of commodity 
exchange.  Indeed much contemporary analysis of legal governance and regulation 
assumes the erosion of an opposition between conflict and consensus (Bignami, 2010; 
Black, 2010).  In light of the use of consensus to support commodity exchange, we 
should update Pashukanis’s legal form analysis in order to include “technical” regulation, 
and analyse communal forms which attribute property rights to subjects. 
  
Pashukanis’s analysis is also useful because it takes subjectivity seriously. He argued that 
law itself constituted a distinct subjectivity in response to the need to exchange things and 
produce commodity value out of them. In order for exchange to proceed and to be legally 
enforceable someone has to be identified as the owner of the thing.  Commodities cannot 
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exchange themselves. Law bequeaths property rights in an individual as part of the task 
of ensuring that exchange of the thing is possible. “At the same time, therefore, that the 
product of labour becomes a commodity and a bearer of value, man acquires the capacity 
to be a legal subject and the bearer of rights” (Pashukanis, 1989: 112). The legal subject 
as the bearer of property rights is not simply a passive reflection of socio-economic 
conditions. Socio-economic conditions might have provided the backdrop for such a 
subject, but legal form is doing work in bringing that subject into being. The constitution 
of the subject as the bearer of rights produces a legal fiction that individuals are formally 
equal, a fiction which is revealed as such when actual property ownership patterns are 
examined. 
  
Pashukanis over-generalised his concept of legal subjectivity in three related ways. He 
extrapolated his conception of legal form from exchange relations, but did not 
acknowledge that other kinds of relations in bourgeois commodity-producing society 
could generate alternative legal forms (Fine, 1979: 43; Fudge, 1999: 163). Secondly, he 
insisted that the subject as bearer of property rights was the primary subject in all legal 
realms including that of coercive state action. In other words he applied his conception 
too generally. Thirdly, his theory could not, and indeed did not try to, account for failures 
to recognise women and other human beings as property owners and therefore legal 
subjects. In other words he could not explain the effects of non-commodified relations. 
His theory was singular in its approach to legal subjectivity; it could not articulate other 
non-property based routes to legal subjectivity and rights-bearing status, such as duty-
imposing relations. In order to be able to use legal form as a method of critical analysis 
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(which reveals power struggles at work through law), we need to abandon the idea that 
legal form only calls the property-owning subject into being. In critically adapting his 
conception, the challenge is to re-specify his legal form as a contractual one, and to 
extrapolate other legal forms from other social relations. We need therefore to recuperate 
legal form analysis as a relational activity which investigates legal form’s representation 
of the social relations it captures, and considers how this representation actively 
contributes to commodity-exchanging societies.   
 
Pashukanis’s account of legal form lends itself to this kind of recuperation because of the 
materialist approach that he adopted.  Pashukanis distinguished his materialist approach 
to legal concepts from two influential schools of thought at the time. He criticised the 
idealists, Kelsen (2005) for example, for speculating on the basis of abstract concepts of 
freedom and subjectivity (Pashukanis, 1989: 76; 110). He was also critical of Marxist 
sociological and psychological approaches to law. In his view they had the merit of 
working empirically, but sought to apply pre-existing concepts to law and did not take 
legal concepts seriously enough. Pashukanis worked with a materialist methodology, like 
his psychological and sociological peers, but unlike the sociologists and more like the 
idealists, he wanted to understand the particularity of legal norms, relations and subjects. 
Yet, unlike the idealists he wanted to analyse legal categories as they developed 
historically (Head, 2008: 71). So for him, a materialist approach “sets itself the task of 
elucidating those historically given material conditions which brought this or that 
category into being” (Pashukanis, 1989: 111).  
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In light of more contemporary historical materialist critique, we might want to distinguish 
between different kinds of historical approaches. Some are more teleological in their 
narration of progressive modernization, whereas others are more multi-dimensional in 
their accommodation of multiple power struggles through history (Bakker, 2007: 542-6; 
Waldby and Cooper, 2008: 65).  Waldby and Cooper draw on Boutang to argue that it is 
not inconsistent to find the co-existence of severe forms of bodily endebtedness, normally 
associated with master/slave relations, and capitalist strategies of accumulation.  Rather it 
is possible to avoid a teleological reading of primitive accumulation and coercive labour 
as the pre-history of capital, and identify it rather as a recurrent necessity of capitalist 
accumulation.  They say: “There is no simple progression from slavery to the freely 
engaged wage contract, but rather a continuum that shifts in accord with the history of 
power struggles”  (2008: 65).  
 In predicting that law would wither away with the death of capitalism, Pashukanis 
adopted a more teleological approach to history (Pashukanis, 1989: 61). He did not think 
it was possible for law to change towards non-capitalist ends, or at least he thought that 
law would cease being law if it did so. He also thought that embryonic legal forms were 
important to study because of what they would reveal about the full development of law 
as such. But it is possible to reinterpret his method so that it is does not adopt a 
teleological approach to history and does allow instead for the co-existence of different 
systems of organisation in history, which exercise contradictory and unpredictable pulls 
on legal relations. In other words, there is no singular legal form which moves from an 
embryonic version to a full-grown one (Hunt, 1985: 25; Gavigan, 1999: 130). Rather, 
there are co-existing diverse legal forms which constitute subjectivity by suggesting that 
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the subject can extract value from and exercise will over social objects in different ways, 
as I will show in relation to reproduction and consumption below.  
  
The other aspect of his method that is useful for critical and feminist perspectives is his 
use of a form/content distinction. His interest in the historical development of legal 
concepts and what they could tell us about changes in society as a whole, led to his 
emphasis on the form as well as the content of legal relations. In this way he spoke to a 
concern in critical scholarship for the mode of representation. Attention to form enabled 
identification of the particular shape which social or legal relations took in a given 
moment, and critique of how that shape might contribute something particular to the 
content.  The legal form of property right responded to a desire to exchange commodities, 
but contributed something particular to commodity exchange by making ownership 
exclusive and individual. The distinction between form and content meant that sometimes 
they would be in harmony with each other, while at other times they would be in tension 
with each other.  The legal regulation of common or shared goods as if they are private, 
individualised entities is one example of such a tension.  Sometimes such a form/content 
tension could contribute to the development of more individualised production, so that 
content became more harmonious with form.  On other occasions, legal forms of 
common or shared ownership were developed or re-asserted in order to better 
accommodate the content of such practices (Petchesky, 1995).  This movement between 
harmony and tension makes change possible and discernible. In the following sections I 
consider how legal form analysis works when it is applied to the traditionally non-
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commodified relations of reproduction, and secondly to the increasingly commodified 
relations of consumption.  
 
Legal form and reproductive carers  
Traditional legal form analysis needs modification because it fails to capture significant 
aspects of social reproduction (Fudge, 1999; Gavigan, 1999; Fletcher, 2003). Feminists 
have developed the concept of social reproduction in order to frame analysis of the 
relationship between care labour and bourgeois commodity-exchanging societies (Engels, 
1972). During the 1970s and 1980s Marxist feminists drew on the concept of domestic 
labour and argued that unpaid caring activities played a key role in the maintenance of 
capitalist commodity-exchanging societies and needed to have their value recognised 
(Barrett and McIntosh, 1982; Kuhn and Wolpe, 1978). The context of neoliberal 
globalization and retrenching welfare states has produced a renewed engagement with the 
costs and contributions of social reproduction (Bakker and Silvey, 2008; Bakker and Gill, 
2003; Rai, Hoskyns and Thomas, 2010). Definitions of social reproduction vary, but it is 
generally acknowledged to have three interacting dimensions: 1) species reproduction, 
including the provision of the sexual and emotional services that maintain the intimate 
relationships within which species reproduction occurs; 2) unpaid provision of goods and 
services to meet needs in the home and community, including different forms of care; 
and, 3) the generation and maintenance of consciousness which mediate existing social 
relations. These activities all contribute to the generation of value in commodity-
exchanging societies, but are not themselves commodified. Legal forms of social 
reproduction are unlikely to interpellate the legal subject as the bearer of property rights, 
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because they do not work with exchangeable commodities. However, legal forms of 
social reproduction may share some of the characteristics of legal forms of commodified 
exchange, as they play a role in generating, caring for and enculturing those engaged in 
commodified exchange.  
 
Historically, reproduction has been opposed to commodification and represented as a gift 
relationship where sustenance and care are freely provided to their receivers. In this 
sense, reproduction was thought to generate obligations of care that could not be 
exchanged in the marketplace. The idea that reproduction is antithetical to 
commodification however, has been subjected to a two-fold critique. On the one hand, 
critics of gift relations have identified commodity-like aspects of gifting, such as origin 
and detachability (see further Strathern, 1992). Gifts, including reproductive ones, are 
forms of non-monetised exchange which may be provided in the expectation of 
reciprocity or future gain (Waldby and Mitchell, 2006; Skeggs, 2010: 32). As O’Brien 
identified, non-commodified reproduction entails an element of calculation in regards to 
reproductive process (1981: 38). Reproducers spend energy on directing their care to 
certain ends, even if they know they are not in complete control of reproductive 
outcomes. If commodified exchange requires the recognition of a subject who has will 
over commodities, reproductive exchange also requires a consciousness of control over 
care. In this way, reproduction and commodification are not conceptually antithetical, 
though they are distinct. 
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Some feminists have long argued that reproducers would benefit from the recognition of 
reproduction’s economic value (Rai et. al., 2010). Putting a price on the cost of care can 
facilitate explicit recognition of care contributions and generate compensation for care 
labour. As Waldby and Cooper (2008) note, those who seek to prohibit commodification 
in favour of a gift from one woman to another, end up institutionalising the self-sacrifice 
of the providing woman. This has the added disadvantage of setting the reproducer apart 
as a non-labourer in conditions where labour is a key means of generating income. 
Securing reproductive exchange requires a subject to exercise will over the reproductive 
process and to direct care to those who need it. In directing care, reproducers respond to 
care deficits or grow new caring arrangements, and contribute to the sustenance of 
societies as they actually exist. In this sense then, reproductive relations are not 
conceptually excluded from generating legal forms. They provide an important site for 
investigating the role of legality in commodity-exchanging societies given the 
reproductive needs of those societies.  Legal form analysis of social reproduction then 
will be interested in the legal generation of subjectivities which bear reproductive 
responsibilities as they participate in commodity-exchanging societies.  
 
At a more empirical level it is obvious that the bearer of care obligations is an important 
and contested form of legal subjectivity. Law holds out the idea that parents have legally 
enforceable responsibilities to care through child welfare principles, but reserves the 
power to enforce those responsibilities differentially. The extent to which reproductive 
responsibilities should be compensated for and accommodated has been the subject of 
extensive commentary on the costs of childcare and the regulation of work/family 
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balance (e.g. Conaghan and Rittich, 2005; Folbre, 1994; Perrons et al, 2006). These 
debates illustrate that the legal attribution of reproductive responsibility performs an 
important role for commodity-exchanging societies. Parents continue to be the default 
bearers, but reproductive responsibility may be transferred between individuals, and 
public bodies regulate and compensate reproductive labour to varying degrees. We can 
say that legal form analysis of reproduction invites critique of the way that legal 
subjectivity is generated through the attribution of reproductive responsibility and care 
obligations.  Subjects are called into legal being as the bearers of care obligations towards 
children and other dependents.  This creates the idea that everyone is equally capable of 
bearing reproductive responsibilities, but this legal form may be at odds with actual 
differential reproductive contributions.  Subjects bear reproductive responsibilities not to 
promote commodity exchange but to support the free provision of care to those who need 
it.  Conflicts may arise between reproductive subjects if they seek more or less 
reproductive responsibility.  But the public as a collective subject is also called into being 
as the common goal of ensuring (quality) social reproduction is sought through legal 
form.  
  
One of the key recent changes in reproductive process is that women and couples are 
planning and spacing their children in order to balance economic security with the desire 
to reproduce. Some countries are using incentive measures to encourage child-bearing out 
of a concern that there will not be enough young people to support the economy, but the 
falling birth rate in the countries of the Economic North show that women are largely 
ignoring state encouragements to have more children (Bakker and Silvey, 2008; Waldby 
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and Cooper, 2008). Some women’s efforts to limit their reproduction have ended up 
before the courts as failed sterilisation measures give rise to claims of professional 
negligence. Yet the courts are reluctant to recognise the birth of a child as a harm 
requiring compensation (Priaulx, 2007). This kind of legal thinking is an illustration of 
the traditional legal form of reproduction. It responds to a conflict over care obligations 
by representing reproduction as a benefit to the reproducer, making the mother 
responsible for childcare and denying care’s monetary value. Compensation for 
reproductive labour is left to technical forms of regulation which provide child benefit, or 
is privatised as an aspect of the ‘family wage’. The legal form of reproductive 
responsibility thus has an impact on people’s reproductive decision-making, and they in 
turn challenge the formal legal characterisation of reproduction as natural and beneficial 
for the reproducer.  The legal form extracts care value out of social reproduction 
processes by legally constituting the subject as she who has will over reproductive 
process by giving her responsibility for it, even if the possibility of exercising that will to 
exit reproduction is limited.  
 
Two issues in particular have been much contested and have contributed to the uneven 
development of this legal form: the legal capacity of reproducers to opt out of or modify 
gestational reproduction and the legal capacity of reproducers to earn money from the 
provision of gametes, embryos or gestational services. From a legal form perspective the 
legal capacity of reproducers to opt out of or modify their gestational reproduction 
involves recognising their provision of gestational care and their right to withdraw that 
care. Conflict over women’s provision of gestational care usually arises in the context of 
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abortion, medical treatment during pregnancy, or drug or alcohol consumption by the 
pregnant woman. Abortion, for example, is usually legally restricted so that a woman has 
this option when particular grounds are met, such as the minimisation of risks to her 
health. In such circumstances, a conflict between pregnant woman and community 
becomes legally represented as a conflict between woman and foetus. At the moment that 
the foetus is legally constituted as a subject in conflict with the pregnant woman, legal 
subjectivity is reconstituted as a potentiality. Reproductive responsibilities are not just 
owed to existing people, but to future people. Thinking about the legal regulation of 
pregnancy and abortion through the lens of legal form makes gestation visible as a kind 
of care provision that has gift-like value. Moreover, legal form analysis also shows us 
how legal subjectivity is expanded by making the subject the bearer of care obligations 
towards an entity that is not yet born. Legal forms of ‘foetal rights’ deny women property 
in their own reproduction, extract future-oriented generative value from pregnancy, and 
consolidate the community as a legal subject.     
 
Another way in which legal form has constituted biological reproduction as a set of care 
obligations, is by preventing its direct commodification. In the context of pregnancy, 
legal rules often stop a woman from earning income from the gestation and birth of a 
child for another. In so doing they characterise women’s gestational care as a non-
commodity and deny them the right to monetary compensation for such care. Legal 
interventions in the context of gamete donation have also been known to inhibit 
commodification as they attempt to restrain a free market in reproduction. Restrictions on 
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paying gamete donors have maintained the legal categorisation of reproduction as a gift-
like relationship: a non-monetised, voluntary contribution to social relations.  
 
Denying gamete providers the means to earn income from their donations 
institutionalises their self-sacrifice and takes advantage of their contributions in 
conditions where the life sciences are highly capitalised (Cooper, M., 2008). The need to 
recognise the economic value of gamete production is becoming more urgent with the 
development of stem cell technologies. As stem cell research develops, tissue is 
becoming valuable for its regenerative as well as its reproductive qualities. Regenerative 
tissue creates the possibility that individuals could be cared for by repairing and adapting 
body parts that no longer work as well as they might. Women constitute the primary 
tissue donors in the new stem cell industries, which use human embryos, oocytes, foetal 
tissue and umbilical cord blood. Waldby and Cooper note that women providers of 
oocytes are in demand by a neoliberalism which seeks to make available “a surplus of 
reproductivity, a reserve of low-cost suppliers of reproductive services and tissues who 
perform unacknowledged reproductive labour within the lowest echelon of the 
bioeconomy” (Waldby and Cooper, 2008: 60; see also Cooper, M., 2008: 129-151; 
Dickenson, 2001). When law prevents donors from earning through the provision of 
gametes, they are compelled to be self-sacrificing gifters and care contributions are 
devalued. Legal form analysis identifies the tension between the legal representation of 
gamete donors as carers whose contributions cannot be commodified, and the practice of 
generating care value for others through gamete donation.  
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Legal form and reproductive users 
Legal form analysis also needs to be developed in order to accommodate the role of 
consumption in commodity-exchanging societies.  Along with many Marxists of his era, 
Pashukanis neglected the role of consumption as an aspect of commodification. 
Consumption was assumed to be a passive process that finally used up the product, 
simply revealing its use value (Warde, 1992; Fletcher, 2006). Consumers were important 
legal subjects for Pashukanis, but he thought of them as buyers and therefore as kinds of 
owners. He did not consider whether consumption played a distinct role in generating 
legal subjectivities. More contemporary analysis of consumption practices has analysed 
the role of taste in displaying cultural capital and cultivating middle-class sensibilities 
(e.g. Bourdieu, 1987). Consumption has also assumed a more important role in the 
expansion of late capitalism as knowledge economies and communication technologies 
proliferate the means and ends of consumption (Lury, 2011). Skeggs has argued that 
concepts of exchange and circulation are key to understanding the new subjectivities that 
are being generated through communication technologies and the management of 
affective labour (2010: 31-3).  Legal form analysis of the relationship between 
subjectivity and commodification needs to address these conceptual and historical gaps.  
  
Spending power accrues to consumers through wages, insurance, credit and loans, and 
not necessarily from property ownership, although the latter obviously may play a role in 
generating credit. Spending power makes a consumer a key market actor in securing the 
exchange of goods and services for money. As a result, consumer preferences become 
key to manufacturers and advertisers as they pitch their products and brands (Miller and 
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Rose, 2001). Consumer desire to enhance quality of life is a goal which gives individuals 
power in the market and is an attribute traders seek to cultivate and direct. Thrift has 
argued that we need to appreciate changes in the commodity form as a result of the 
impact of consumers as they “co-create” commodities and leave them in a constant state 
of experimentation (2006). Legal form analysis would benefit from consideration of 
consumption also because gender may motivate consumption in numerous ways. Caring 
for dependents necessitates the purchase of goods, and people meet their affective and 
sexual needs through accessing services.   
 
The formal legal sphere provides key opportunities to observe and critique the generation 
of subjectivities who want access to goods and services.  Law has participated in the 
development of consumer capitalism by expanding the protection of consumer rights 
beyond the context of contract law (Scheiderman, 1998). Anti-discrimination law has 
moved beyond the scope of employment to that of access to goods and services, so that 
providers cannot deny consumers the use of a good or service on irrational grounds. 
Equality in the consumer market has become as contested as equality in the labour 
market. This development has been driven by civil society demands for equality and 
fairness as much as by businesses that want to open out their provision. The legal right of 
access to goods and services has become a key signifier of legal equality at the same time 
as self-fulfilment through consumption intensifies. In the process, law contributes to 
consumer practices and consumer subjectivities.   
 
The derivation of a right to receive services from the right to provide services in the law 
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regulating free movement is a particularly interesting case because it illustrates clearly 
the contribution of legal form to service use.  Legal provisions, which were understood to 
protect the right to provide and receive services offered for remuneration in the 
marketplace, have been interpreted so as to apply to publicly funded services such as 
those supplied by the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) (Hervey and McHale, 2004; 
Harrington, 2009). Rights derived from the ability to pay for a good or service in the 
marketplace have imposed qualified obligations on public authorities to use tax based 
funds on behalf of service consumers in a cross border EU context. The courts have said 
that what matters is the simple fact of a payment for the service, even if the 
reimbursement is to be sought from tax funds. The formal presence of a single market 
transaction (e.g. the purchase of a treatment) in the absence of substantive market 
relations (e.g. where a reimbursement is being claimed from the National Health Service) 
has allowed the courts to maintain the fiction that public services are private. The general 
legal form of consumption has developed so as to erode the distinction between public 
and private insurance, and, apparently between tax funds and private funds. In other 
words, a specific socio-economic right to a healthcare service has become enforceable 
against the state because legal form has interpellated the subject as a market consumer in 
spite of the fact that the claim is being made against a public health system funded from 
the tax base and managed by state mechanisms. The effect is to re-commodify welfare 
services which were originally provided in order to, as Esping Andersen famously 
argued, decommodify the status of individuals vis-a-vis the market (1990: 21, see further 
Newdick, 2008; and Gibson-Graham, 1996).  
 
 
 
23 
The demand for the legal form of healthcare consumption has come from ordinary 
patients (Newdick, 2006). Individuals get recognised as the bearers of rights to access 
healthcare services, and contribute indirectly to the privatization of public healthcare 
services. Law plays a role in these processes by recognising the consumer’s rights and 
positing an equivalence between the receiver and the provider of the commodity. The 
legal subject of the consumer differs from that of the exclusive property-owner in the 
sense that it is the subject’s spending power rather than ownership per se which is 
significant. The legal form of consumption invokes the subject as the chooser of 
commodities, thus bequeathing a right of use, rather than a right to own. This legal form 
is similar to Pashukanis’s legal form in the sense that market exchange is key, but it 
emphasises the significance of the user rather than the owner per se.   
 
The legal form of user rights could also have an impact on the legal regulation of 
biological reproduction, just as property rights has had an influence. Rights to use 
reproductive components and reproductive technologies have been legally recognised, 
even if conditions on such use have also been imposed (Jackson, E., 2001).  User rights 
have the potential to challenge and change legal forms of care obligations as those who 
participate in reproduction come to play the role of consumer in relation to reproductive 
processes. The capacity of gamete-donors to opt out of or modify their engagement in 
collaborative reproduction is an interesting example in circumstances where they have 
been given consent rights over the use of their gametes. Some have referred to these 
consent rights as quasi property rights (Ford, 2005: 272).  But here I want to focus on the 
effect of the legal form of consent rights on the understanding of production and use in 
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relation to embryos for assisted reproduction.  In recognising consent rights, legal form 
constitutes the producer of sperm or eggs as a subject who has will over gametes and can 
exchange them as donations, not as commodities. The producers cannot sell their 
gametes, but they can transfer care obligations in relation to them.  The fact that someone 
may then go on to use the gametes in order to conceive and reproduce a child has the 
legal effect of strengthening the transfer powers of the gamete producer by giving them 
veto rights over subsequent use.   
 
As the Evans case1 illustrates, a conflict may arise between gamete donors and potential 
users over the fate of an embryo to which both donors have contributed. In Evans, the 
woman who had contributed her eggs towards the generation of the embryos in question 
wanted to use them in order to reproduce.  The man who had contributed his sperm did 
not want the embryos to be used as he did not want to father children.  The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 gave each consent rights over the use of the 
embryo, which meant that he had the legal power to veto her use of the embryos.  She 
ultimately failed in her human rights challenge to the clinic’s decision to destroy the 
embryos in light of his veto (see further Sheldon, 2004; Morris and Nott, 2009).  In legal 
terms, both parties were in an equivalent position because they were each bearers of a 
genetic interest in the embryo.  In circumstances where such equivalent interests clash, 
the negative right to avoid reproduction trumps the positive right to reproduce. As a 
result, the absence of the sperm donor’s consent to the future use of the resulting embryo 
decided the issue. In this instance legal form refuses to compel reproduction against his 
will and associates care value with voluntariness. 
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Some feminist commentators have criticised the reasoning which informs the decision on 
the grounds that it misrecognises her greater interest in using the embryo to become a 
mother.  Their critiques rely on either her past greater contribution to the production of 
the embryo (e.g. Donchin, 2008), or on her greater investment in future parenting (e.g. 
Scott-Harris, 2010).  In other words, they imply that the legal representation of genetic 
connection as the basis for the deciding interest unjustifiably renders both reproductive 
contributors equivalent.  The legal form of consent rights over one’s genetically related 
embryo does not take account of the differences between past contributions through egg 
production and sperm production.  Nor does it take adequate account of differences in the 
emotional, psychological or financial investment in future parenting between the parties.  
By asking whether and how the legal form of consent rights fits with and extracts value 
from the content of the parties’ past contributions and future use, legal form analysis 
helps differentiate between these different moments in the generation of care value from 
reproductive processes.   
 
Sperm generation and egg generation are not equivalent processes in labour terms as they 
make different demands on their generators. For Waldby and Cooper, oocyte generation 
is a form of clinical labour which entails “giving clinics access to the productivity of 
[women’s] in vivo biology, the biological labour of living tissues and reproductive 
processes” and involves “second-order tasks; compliance with often-complex medical 
regimes of dosing, testing, appointments and self-monitoring” (2008: 59). Donchin 
comments: “Only she undergoes the risks and rigors of IVF including treatment with 
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hyperovulatory drugs, frequent monitoring to avoid complications, and surgery to extract 
her ova. He need only ejaculate into a cup” (2008: 36). Legal form analysis enables 
critics to identify the gap between the legal representation of the gamete donor (as one 
who has a veto over the use of the gamete), and the actual labour which gave rise to that 
gamete. This responds to feminist concerns that women’s clinical and generative labour 
is not being adequately recognized as the value of different contributions to gamete 
production is rendered equivalent by consent rights derived from genetic relatedness.   
 
Secondly, legal form analysis allows critics to identify any gaps between the contribution 
of genetic relatedness and the contribution of actual investments into future parenting. 
For feminist commentators such as Scott-Harris (2010), law should be reluctant to accept 
the veto rights of the male gamete donor when this would have the effect of denying the 
female gamete donor the opportunity to mother a child to whom she is genetically 
related. Her right to use the embryo should be given more weight than his right not to use 
it because she has a lot invested in that future use, not because of her greater past 
contribution. This approach has the merit of giving weight to emotional and practical 
investment in future parenting; it helps us identify the need for legal form to 
accommodate these investments as well as the genetic connection itself. In thinking about 
the different dimensions of care value captured by legal forms of reproduction, we need 
to think about the way in which individuals make social contributions by anticipating and 
preparing for future care obligations. There is a problem however with the way that this 
point  - about accommodating the actual investment in future parenting – has been made 
by those such as Scott-Harris.  She argues that women are more likely than men to have 
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such an investment because women’s value has historically been cultivated through 
motherhood.  The problem is that the critique ends up making general assumptions about 
women as a group, and men as a group, when it would be possible to focus on the actual 
investment individuals have made in a future reproductive role.  In other words, Scott 
Harris’s feminist critique ends up giving more weight to women’s contributions because 
they are women, and not because of the actual material role played by investment in 
future care roles.  This is problematic because it re-asserts sexed status rather than the 
‘doing of caring’ as a key signifer for gender.  This has the effect of negating the 
investment which the non-user in this instance may also have made in certain 
reproductive outcomes.   Legal form analysis however would ask whether the legal 
assumption that both parties have made equal investments in future reproductive, or non-
reproductive, roles, adequately accommodates the actual investments that they have made 
in their anticipation of future parenthood.  On this view, a party’s investment in not 
becoming a genetic parent merits accommodation as well, and the question of how to 
accommodate such investment becomes more of an empirical one.  
 
Conclusion 
Feminist critiques of the relationship between legality, commodification and gender 
could benefit from a renewed engagement with Pashukanis and the concept of legal form.  
Legal form analysis show us how legal forms - property rights, care obligations, user 
rights – contribute to the generation of value in commodity-exchanging societies.  
Pashukanis showed us how legal forms play a distinct role in ensuring the generation of 
exchange value from the production of things through the constitution of the legal subject 
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as the bearer of property rights over those things. Pashukanis’s conception of legal form 
can serve as a touchstone for feminists interested in negotiating a pathway beyond a 
dichotomous relationship between reproduction and commodification, and towards a 
greater appreciation of the way that reproduction and commodification work on and 
through each other. The problems with Pashukanis’ legal method do not in themselves 
render legal form analysis devoid of critical value. Just as Marxist materialist frameworks 
have been developed in order to address conceptual inadequacies and historical changes 
Hennessy and Ingraham (1997), so legal form analysis can be developed. By reading 
Pashukanis’ method through a more contemporary, non-teleological lens, we can adapt 
his method of legal form analysis to take account of neglected and new dimensions of 
commodity exchanging societies. 
 
The limits of Pashukanis’s legal form analysis have long been obvious to feminists who 
have shown how it fails to capture relations of reproduction. However, feminist work on 
social reproduction has shown us how non-commodified reproductive care labour makes 
a distinct contribution to commodity-exchanging societies, and how care labour has been 
more intensely commodified in recent times. Legal disputes over care obligations 
illustrate that legal form plays a role in securing reproductive exchange. In developing 
legal form analysis in light of the legal regulation of reproduction, the question becomes 
one about the role of the legal attribution of reproductive responsibility in order to 
generate care value. In this way legal form analysis offers us a method of looking behind 
the formal attribution of reproductive responsibility to carers such as pregnant women or 
gamete donors, and ask how value is generated in these processes.  
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Changes to the commodity form under advanced capitalism suggest a second reason for 
the modification and updating of legal form analysis. The development of consumer 
capitalism means that the subjectivity of the consumer is increasingly given legal form. 
As the consumption of goods and services becomes such a central activity the legal form 
of use right is becoming more distinct from the legal form of property right. The 
regulation of reproductive components and technologies shows us how legal subjects 
have been brought into being as the bearers of user rights in relation to those components 
and technologies.  Legal form analysis asks us to look behind law’s attribution of 
equivalence to the bearers’ of consent rights on the basis of genetic connection.  Instead, 
legal form analysis suggests that we ask whether that legal form accommodates past care 
contributions which have made reproductive exchange possible, and the effects of future 
care obligations arising from reproductive exchange. In this way, legal form analysis 
provides a reading of legal contributions to the generation of value from human 
reproductive activities without making assumptions about their gendered content. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Evans v United Kingdom (Application no. 6339/05), European Court of Human Rights 
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